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WILLS
COLEMAN KARESH*
The subject of Wills in this review of case law comprehends
the same topics as the law school course of the same name:
Wills, Intestate Succession and Administration of Estates. It
does not deal with the nature of estates created by vill. This
is left to Property.
Although the total number of decided cases in the Wills field
during the period of review is not large, the cases of interest
and significance are in more than the usual ratio. They fall
into several categories. Some of them overlap with other-sub-
jects and may be repeated in the treatment of those subjects
in this review.
Revocation
The case of Stevens v. Royalls' presents a wills problem
that does not often arise: partial revocation by act done to the
instrument. The applicable statute2 covering revocation per-
mits partial or pro tanto revocation by act done to the instru-
ment, the words "or any clause thereof" in the statute lend-
ing themselves to this interpretation.3 In this case, the testator
devised residual and other property to his wife "until 1956, at
which time Drome Johnson will become 21 years of age," when
the land should pass to Drome Johnson on certain limitations.
The Johnson named was the son of an adopted son of the
testator. When the will was found after testator's death, the
quoted and subsequent words appeared stricken through with
pen, but entirely legible. On the margin of the will there ap-
peared these words:
I do hereby cancel a portion of this will. Droom John-
son is to have $200.00 cash Dec. (1958) Given him no
land no other property other items herein not cancelled
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina, School of Law.
1. 223 S.C. 510, 77 S.E. 2d 198 (1953).
2. CODE oF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 19-221, as amended by
S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954, No. 683, p. 1745, which now
reads as follows: "No will or testament, in writing, of any real or per-
sonal property or any clause thereof, shall be revocable but by some other
will or codicil in writing, . . . or by destroying or obliterating the
same .... "
3. Brown v. Brown, 91 S.C. 101, 74 S.E. 135 (1911).
196
1
Karesh: Wills
Published by Scholar Commons, 1954
SURVEY OV SOUTH CARoLINA LAW
in this will shall be permanent. The land herein of my
estate described in item 4 not sold shall be the property
of my wife all and singler this 2d July 1948 W. D. Ste-
vens (L.S.)/Witness W. A. Royals.
The marginal writing was, of course, ineffectual either as
a revocation or as a new disposition, for want of proper at-
testation. The cancellation and the marginal writing were
intended both to work a revocation of the gift to Johnson
and to enlarge the estate of the wife. It was held that neither
act-the obliteration or the writing-could serve to create a
new disposition in favor of the wife and that the attempted
revocation did not operate to withdraw the gift from John-
son. It is axiomatic, the Court points out, that obliteration
may be used to revoke but not to create a different estate.
The case harks back to the celebrated case of Pringle v. Mc-
Pherson.4 There, in substance, the testator made a gift in one
clause of his will "to my daughter Elizabeth 300 acres part
of my Newton tract of land." In another clause he gave to his
two daughters Susan and Nancy all his Pon Pon Plantations
"except the 300 acres before devised to Elizabeth." On the
testator's death the will showed a cancellation of the devise
to Elizabeth. The words "except the 300 acres devised to
Elizabeth" were likewise stricken through. The striking of
the exception was held, naturally, to be inoperative, because
it would amount to a new devise-that is, giving the two
daughters 300 acres more than the will originally gave them.
The other question then was as to the effect of the cancellation
of the clause containing the gift to Elizabeth. The Court
reached the conclusion that there was no revocation, not be-
cause it could not take place as a result of the form it took,
but because the revocation of the gift to Elizabeth was condi-
tioned upon the efficacy of the attempted enlargement of the
gift to Susan and Nancy, the Court resorting to Onions v.
Tyrerr and its doctrine of dependent relative revocation to re-
store the cancelled gift to Elizabeth.
Since Pringle v. McPherson, supra, recognized the propriety
of giving effect to an intended revocation-which in itself
did not make the new devise although coupled with other acts
which did-there would seem to be at least the possibility that
in the instant case the obliteration which annulled the gift to
4. 2 Brev. 279, 3 Am. Dee. 718 (1809).
5. 1 P. Wins. 845 (1717).
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Johnson might have been given the intended effect, while the
intended enlargement by the striking out of "until 1956" would
be denied effect. In other words, so far as expunging would
make a new gift, it would be disregarded; so far as other
expunging only took away, it should be respected. If the tes-
tator, as in Pringle v. McPherson, supra, had revoked the gift
to Johnson conditioned upon the efficacy of the substituted
gift to his wife, there would have been a dependent relative
revocation which would have restored the cancelled gift. Here
there was manifest an opposite intent-in view particularly
of the marginal writing-and the result could have been, it is
submitted, an absolute revocation of the ultimate gift to John-
son, without, however, increasing the estate of the wife. Her
estate still would have been a term for years, the reversion
passing as intestate property.
Survival of Causes of Action
Where an insurer fraudulently cancels a policy of life insur-
ance, the wrong done to the insured is not such as to survive
his death and hence there is no cause of action to pass to his
personal representative. That has long been the law, such a
wrong not involving physical injury to person or property
falling within the salvage provisions of the Survival Act.6 But,
in Babb v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co.,7 decided on June
22, 1953, it was held that while an action for fraud and deceit
as a wrong done to the insured will not survive, the fraudulent
cancellation of the policy is a wrong as well to the beneficiary,
and that while the beneficiary, if he has no vested right, can-
not sue therefor during the insured's lifetime, he can sue after
the insured's death. Such an action falls outside the possi-
bilities of the Survival Act, because the wrong sued upon is
the wrong done to the beneficiary, and not to the insured.
The decision is amply bolstered by the Court with authorities,
both local and general. For all practical purposes, the concern
with non-survival of the action for fraud and deceit upon the
insured ceases to have significance: the beneficiary sues in his
own behalf for the invasion of his, and not the insured's,
rights.
6. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-209; Mattison v. Pal-
metto State Life Ins. Co., 197 S.C. 256, 15 S.E. 2d 117 (1941).
7. 224 S.C. 1, 77 S.E. 2d 267 (1953).
[Vol. 7
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Contracts to Make Wills
Cases of this kind fall within many areas of the law: Equity,
Property, Wills, Contracts, etc. They are frequent visitors
to the South Carolina courts. Two of them were before the
Supreme Court in the period under survey. They are Kirk-
patrick v. Kirkpatrick," and McLauchlin v. Gressette.9 Both
were actions for specific performance of alleged oral con-
tracts to make wills, and in each the plaintiff satisfied the
Court through the "clear and convincing testimony" required
in such cases that the alleged contracts were in fact made.
The part performance necessary to remove the cases from the
Statute of Frauds was also found to have taken place. No
new law of any significance has appeared in this type of case
for many years, and the quest in them has been principally
one of determining the facts. In sifting the facts, the Court,
in McLauchtin v. Gressette, supra, was confronted with the
contract problem that so often arises in cases of this kind:
were the statements made by the alleged promisor simply ex-
pressions of intention or promises made with contractual pur-
pose? The line is hard to draw, but, like other fact questions,
is resolved from a consideration of the whole picture of the
case.1 0
Joint Deposits
In Hawkins v. Thackcston,1 ' the Supreme Court has given a
definitive and welcome answer to this question: Where one
person deposits money in a bank or building and loan (or fed-
eral savings and loan) association, and the account is payable
to himself or another, or to either or the survivor, and the
depositor dies first, is the survivor entitled to receive and re-
tain the money deposited? The answer which the Court gives
is in favor of the survivor, provided the depositor had a do-
native intent. Prior to this decision, the law was not entirely
clear. In Sawyer v. Mabus,12 it was held that a certificate of
deposit payable to A or Mrs. A, but purchased by A and re-
tained by him, belonged to the administrator of A's estate and
not to Mrs. A. The Court treated the transaction as an im-
perfect gift, and also as an invalid testamentary disposition.
8. 223 S.C. 357, 75 S.E. 2d 876 (1953).
9. 224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E. 2d 149 (1953).
10. See Callum v. Rice, 35 S.C. 551, 15 S.E. 268 (1891); Bruce v.
Green, 118 S.C. 27, 110 S.E. 77 (1921).
11. 224 S.C. 445, 79 S.E. 2d 714 (1954).
12. 107 S.C. 369, 92 S.E. 1029 (1916).
19541
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The decision was held controlling later in Smith v. Planters
Bank,'3 which involved also a certificate of deposit payable
likewise to A or B. A, the depositor, having died, the bank
paid over to B, and the administrator of A's estate sued the
banlk and recovered. The majority of the Court treated the
deposit, in the form made, as creating a revocable agency
which terminated on the death of the depositor. A concurring
opinion denied validity to the attempted posthumous owner-
ship on the further grounds that there was no contract be-
tween the depositor and the alternative payee, imperfectness
of the gift, no trust, and invalidity as a testamentary disposi-
tion.
The rigors of the Smith case were ameliorated by the pass-
age of an act in 1935, amended in 1944, protecting the deposi-
tory, bank or building and loan association in paying over to
the survivor. These Acts are embodied in the 1952 Code.' 4
Although these statutes undertake to absolve the bank or
association in paying to the survivor, they say nothing of the
ultimate rights of the survivor, and standing alone they cannot
be regarded as changing the basic law of the Sawyer and
Smith cases so far as the rights of the survivor are concerned.
Yet in a dictum in a case involving the creation of survivor-
ship or joint estates in land, 15 it was stated, in sympathetic
consideration for the survivor: "There is nothing vicious about
the right of survivorship. Indeed, it was recognized by our
General Assembly in the enactment of the statute relating to
bank deposits. Section 7851 of the 1942 Code." (Secs. 8-171,
8-602, 1952 Code.)
13. 124 S.C. 100, 117 S.E. 312 (1922).
14. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 8-171. Payment of
Deposits ~ade in Name of Two Persons. When any deposit has been
made in any bank, banking institution or depository transacting busi-
ness in this state in the names of two persons, payable to either or
payable to either or the survivor, such deposit or any part thereof may
e paid to either of such persons, whether the other be living or not
and the receipt or acquittance of the person paid shall be valid and
sufficient release and discharge for any or all payments so made. The
ternm deposit shall include a certificate of deposit.
CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 8-602. Shares Issued to
Two Persons. When any certificate or share of stock has been issued
by any building and loan association or Federal savings and loan asso-
ciation transacting business in this state in the names of two persons,
redeemable or payable to either, or payable to or redeemable by the
survivor, such share or certificate may be paid to or redeemed by either
of such persons, whether one be living or not, and the receipt or acquit-
tance of such association by the person so paid or the person who re-
deemed such share or certificate shall be valid and sufficient release
or discharge for any and all such payments, redemptions or repurchases
made of such share or certificate of stock.
15. Davis v. Davis, 223 S.C. 182, 75 S.E. 2d 46 (1953).
[Vol. 7
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In Hawkins v. Thackston, the deposit was an investment in
the shares of a federal savings and loan association, the pass-
book showing the issuance of shares to the depositor or his
niece, the plaintiff. The passbook was kept by the uncle. The
decision of the Court recognizes the impropriety of the trans-
action as a gift, as a trust, or as a testamentary disposition,
but -it upholds the right of the survivor to retain the deposit,
not only on the basis of the statutes but on the principal
ground that such an arrangement is a contract for the benefit
of a third party: i.e., the bank is the promisor, the depositor
the promisee, and the designated alternative payee the third
party donee beneficiary. In this respect, the Court states that
the transaction resembles a policy of life insurance, where the
beneficiary-not himself a party to the contract-is the third
party beneficiary. The Court disposes of the contrary hold-
ings in the Sawyer and Smith cases by declaring that they had
failed to take notice of the contract character of the trans-
action. For all practical purposes, so far as the earlier cases
denied validity to the gift-contract, they are no longer law.
Presumptively, the fact that a deposit is made in the form
designated by the statutes indicates an intention to make the
survivor the beneficial owner of the deposits. It is made plain
in the Hawkins case that the presumption may be negatived
by showing a lack of donative intent. Much of the testimony
in the case is directed to an attempt by those resisting the sur-
vivor's claim to eliminate the presumption through proof of
an agency-that the deposit was made in the particular form
for the convenience of the uncle. The attempt was not suc-
cessful. It is apparent that claims of survivors to such ac-
counts may be attacked on the ground of terminable agency-
and in this respect the Sawyer and Smith cases may still stand
as the law if, in fact, there was agency. To guard against this
possibility, if there is a donative intent, the designation of the
deposit or share account as payable to either or the survivor,
rather than only to either, is recommended: the depositor
would hardly contemplate an agency after his death, if indeed
such a thing is possible. Such a designation would nullify
agency and fortify the gift presumption.
1954]
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LEGISLATION
Revocation of Wills
The 1942 Code Section dealing with revocation of wills fol-
lowed quite faithfully the original Statute of Frauds (Section
VI) affecting revocation of devises. Since 1824-when the
formalities for the revocation of wills of real and personal
property were put on a parity-the language of the revocation
statute remained virtually unchanged, and it appeared in the
1942 Code (Sec. 8921) as follows:
No will or testament, in writing, of any real or personal
property, or any clause thereof, shall be revocable but by
some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing de-
claring the same, attested and subscribed by three wit-
nesses as aforesaid, or by destroying or obliterating the
same by the testator himself, or some other person in his
presence, and by his directions and consent.
In a spirit of fine editorial endeavor, the revisers of the
Code changed the foregoing section to read as follows in the
1952 Code (Sec. 19-221) :
No will or testament of any real or personal property
or any clause thereof shall be revocable but by some other
will or codicil in writing or other writing declaring the
same, attested and subscribed by three witnesses as re-
quired by Section 19-205, or by the testator himself or
some other person in his presence and by his direction and
consent destroying and obliterating the same.
The principal objection to the 1952 version-aside from the
question of the necessity of overhauling a statute that had re-
ceived a settled interpretation over a very long period-was
the substitution of "and" for "or" between the words "destroy-
ing" and "obliterating." Taking the word "and" in its pri-
mary sense, the statute would require both destruction and
obliteration, something which could be accomplished only in
reverse order-that is, first obliterate and then destroy. More-
over, the meaning given to the word "destroying" is "burn-
ing, cancelling, tearing"-any of these.' 6 Accordingly, the
requirements of the 1952 Code would be "burning, cancelling,
tearing and obliterating." To have the animus revocandi
manifested in these several conjunctive ways would call for
16. Johnson v. Brailsford, 2 N. & McC. 272 (1820).
[Vol. 7
7
Karesh: Wills
Published by Scholar Commons, 1954
SURVE Y OV SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
a calculated frenzy that would certainly make it plain that
the testator intended to revoke - and no mistake about it.
These dire possibilities have been removed by the restoration
by the 1954 General Assembly of the language of the 1942 Code
in substance, with the rightful reinstatement of "or" at the
crucial spot:
No will or testament, in writing, of any real or personal
property, or any clause thereof, shall be revocable but by
some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing de-
claring the same, attested and subscribed by three wit-
nesses as required by Section 19-205, or by destroying
or obliterating the same by the testator himself, or some
other person in his presence, and by his directions and
consent.
Adoption
The 1954 General Assembly enacted the following statute,17
approved March 26, 1954:
SECTION 1. Whenever a child has been legally adopted,
such child shall inherit from the adopting parents, and
from each of them, and the adopting parents and each or
either of them shall inherit from the adopted child, to
the same extent as if he were a natural child of the adopt-
ing parents. For all inheritance purposes without excep-
tion the adopted child shall be considered a natural child
of the adopting parents and in the event of the death of
such adopted child, his estate shall ascend, descend and
be distributed as is otherwise provided by law for natural
born children of the same family, to the exclusion of the
natural or blood parents of such child, provided, however,
where one of the natural parents be united in bonds of
matrimony to the other adopting parent then in such
event the rules of inheritance as above set out shall attach
as -if said child were the natural child of both such par-
ents, provided, further, a natural child shall inherit from
an adopted child and an adopted child shall inherit from
a natural child as if they were natural children of the
adopting parent or parents, and in like manner adopted
children of the same family shall inherit from each other.
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, adoption con-
ferred only the right to the adopted child to inherit from the
17. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954, No. 698, p. 1763.
1954]
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adopting parent. There was no reciprocal right, and no right
to inherit by or from collaterals. The 1954 Act plainly cre-
ates a reciprocal right in the adopting parent. It is also plain
that the natural or blood parents are cut off by the adoption.
It is further reasonably plain that once there is an adoption,
the adopted child becomes as much a member of the family as
if he had been born into it-that is, to the extent that natural
and other adopted children inherit from the adopted child and
he from them. But what is not clear is what is meant by the
language "For all inheritance purposes without exception the
adopted child shall be considered a natural child of the adopt-
ing parents and in the event of the death of such adopted
child, his estate shall ascend, descend and otherwise be dis-
tributed to the exclusion of the natural or blood parents of
such child, . . ." (Italics supplied.)
If the adopted child is to be treated without exception as a
natural child for purposes of inheritance, then much of what
is specially provided for is unnecessary. What answers would
be given to these questions: If the natural parent or other
natural kin of the adopted child should die, can he inherit
from him or them or is he now so completely channeled into
the new family as to break all ties with his blood kin? If the
adopted child dies intestate, survived neither by his adopting
parents nor by any new brothers or sisters under the statute,
would kin of the adopting parent-strangers in blood-take?
Or if a collateral kinsman of the adopting parent died in-
testate, would the adopted child take from him? For example,
the adopting parent has died, and a brother of his subse-
quently dies: would the adopted child take as a nephew?
The statute is perhaps too ambitious in scope. Certainly it
is ambiguous. It is to be hoped that no practical complications
will arise before a chance to clarify it by amendment comes
around.
Legitimation
In 1951, the General Assembly enacted the following statute
-re-enacted as follows into the 1952 Code:
Sec. 20-6.1. When either of the contracting parties to a
marriage that is void under the provisions of Sec. 20-6
entered into the marriage contract in good faith and in
ignorance of the incapacity of the other party, any chil-
dren born of the marriage shall be deemed legitimate and
[Vol. 7
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have the same legal rights as a child born in lawful wed-
lock.
By Act approved March 26, 1954, the General Assembly
amended Sec. 20-6.1 by causing to be inserted between the
words "faith" and "and" the words "on or after April 13,
1951," so that the statute now reads:
When either of the contracting parties to a marriage
that is void under the provisions of Section 20-6 entered
into the marriage contract in good faith on or after April
13, 1951, and in ignorance of the incapacity of the other
party, any children born of the marriage shall be deemed
legitimate and have the same legal rights as a child born
in lawful wedlock.
Presumably, the addition of the words "on or after April
13, 1951," was intended to indicate a legislative purpose that
the statute should have a prospective and not a retrospective
operation-April 13, 1951, being the date on which the Act
was originally approved. In terms of inheritance, it would
be immaterial as to rights which had vested in estates created
on deaths prior to April 13, 1951, whether the statute was
prospective or retrospective-since such rights having previ-
ously vested could not be disturbed. It would be a matter of
statutory construction and constitutional law-not within the
scope of this subject-to determine whether the Legislature,
having decreed the legitimacy of children born under the cir-
cumstances mentioned, without using terms of futurity, and
thereby possibly legitimating children born of invalid mar-
riages contracted prior to the approval date, could lawfully
thereafter make the legislation only prospective. To do so
might result in a legislative bastardization of children previ-
ously declared legitimate. While it may be true that the Lord
giveth and the Lord taketh away, it is doubtful that such
power resides in the General Assembly.
1954]
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